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1 A legal problem1
1.1 Wrongful life
In 2005 the Dutch Supreme Court decided a wrongful life case.2 This
case concerned a woman who consulted her midwife during her preg-
nancy because there had been two cases of handicaps in her husband’s
family, due to chromosomal disorder. The midwife did not think it neces-
sary to investigate the matter any further. This was later considered a pro-
fessional failure with dramatic effects. When born, baby Kelly turned out
to have serious mental and physical handicaps from which she suffered
severely. The parents claimed damage – both on their own accord and in
Kelly’s name – and their claims were sustained by both the court of
appeal and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court not only considered
the strictly legal issues but also considered moral and pragmatic argu-
ments that had been put forward against such so-called ‘wrongful life
claims’. Firstly, there is the moral opposition that sustaining these claims
violates the principle regarding the dignity of human life, since it ack-
nowledges that not being born is preferable to living in a condition like
hers. Secondly, there is the pragmatic argument that sustaining claims
like this will tempt doctors to practice ‘defensive medicine’ to avoid
serious risk. Both arguments were carefully examined by the court and
subsequently rejected. What does the Supreme Court in fact do here?
Does it call out or explain the law to us? Or does it exceed its limits by ela-
borating on principles and policies, taking into account the moral
grounds and the possible consequences of the ruling itself? In both
directions the question arises: what constitutes the limits of private law?
1.2 Law without limits?
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in this case exemplifies a pattern
that is not uncommon in hard cases, at least not in our part of the
world. In first instance it reasons within the context of the accepted
sources of law, in this case the relevant provisions of the civil code in an
accepted interpretation. In hard cases though, the result of this
approach is not completely satisfactory, since the decision is underde-
termined by the law. On the one hand, the relevant rules and prece-
dents do not offer sufficient guidance for the decision, while on the
other hand the decision reached cannot be sufficiently justified by the
1. This paper is first published in Hofstra Law Review volume 35, no. 4, summer 2007,
p.1725-1753.
2. HR 18 march 2005, LJN AR5213 (baby Kelly).
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relevant rules and precedents. In the light of the relevant facts the law
shows certain ‘gaps’, as it were, which have to be filled by other factors
than the accepted sources of law. Therefore, the Supreme Court
appeals, in second instance, to principles and policies to fill these gaps,
by taking and justifying a decision for the case at hand. Its reasoning
can therefore be considered as a two-step line of reasoning, although
the steps cannot always be clearly identified or separated.
This two-step line of reasoning, however, displays some specific charac-
teristics about the limits of law. First, it shows us that the law has what
since H.L.A. Hart has been referred to as an ‘open texture’, which
means that its rules, precedents or whatever standard of behavior will
always, in the end, prove to be indeterminate. This is the result of the
general nature of the language used and the unpredictability of the
social reality in which legal rules, principles and precedents are
applied.3 Rules are not self-applying, as Wittgenstein noted, and their
application is therefore intrinsically mixed with the facts of the case or,
in other words, its context.4 This is the meaning of the old Roman ada-
gium ‘ius in causa positum’; the law is, in the end, given with the facts.
The two-step line of reasoning displays the open texture of law, but it
also shows us something of the more fundamental nature of law. The
contextual gaps of the law are often filled by principles and policies, by
values and practices, by idealistic and pragmatic notions.
This leads to an important distinction of three different dimensions of
law, namely the positivistic dimension (accepted sources of law), the
idealistic dimension (‘de lege ferenda’, law as it ought to be) and the
pragmatic dimension (‘law in action’, law as it turns out to be). In a per-
fect world, perhaps, these dimensions would coincide. We do not live in
a perfect world, however, and we are brought up with the tensions
between ‘law as it is’ and ‘law as it ought to be’, on the one hand, and
between ‘law in the books’ and ‘law in action’ on the other. Moralists and
realists have made a business of exploiting these tensions as a domain
of research. Lawyers, judges and courts tend to exploit them in finding
an acceptable solution for a specific case. First, they appeal to the positi-
vistic dimension to decide a case, but in hard cases they often appeal to
the other dimensions as well (as they did in the Wrongful life case). Law
then, seems to encompass more than we are inclined to think at first
sight. What, then, are its limits? And how are we to find them?
3. H.L.A. Hart, The concept of law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961, p. 124.
4. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1978, par. 84-87.
Hofstra.fm  Page 8  Wednesday, January 9, 2008  1:57 PM
Limits of private law 9
These are highly disputed questions in legal theory. Three Grand Old
Theories of law have haunted us for many centuries now. Legal positi-
vism acknowledges the existence of idealistic and pragmatic dimen-
sions, but considers those to be beyond the limits of the law. It defines
law by its positivistic dimension, the black letter law of our first intui-
tion. Natural law theory, on the contrary, takes the idealistic dimension
to be the defining characteristic element of law, whereas the positive
norms are only shadows of these real norms, that lead a somewhat
undetermined life ‘in the omnipresent brooding of the sky’ (paraphra-
sing Oliver Wendell Holmes). Legal realism, lastly, considers the law to
be the facts and practices that constitute legal norms and that precede
and follow from black letter law. These three Grand Old Theories each
take different characteristics of law to be defining: the positivistic, the
idealistic, and the pragmatic dimension, respectively. As the German
postwar legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch has shown convincingly
these dimensions are not to be considered as different conceptions of
law but are inherent tensions within the concept of law. The different
dimensions of law serve different values, i.e. legal certainty, justice and
purpose respectively. These values can never be realized completely at
the same time. In law, as elsewhere, inherent values rarely coincide and
mostly conflict with each other. The best one can do in legal practice is
to look for and find an equilibrium, which exemplifies an optimal com-
bination of these values.5
What the Grand Old Theories share, in all their differences, is the mis-
taken view that the concept of law, and thus its limits, is the result of
definition. In my view, instead of defining the concept of law we’d bet-
ter investigate the phenomena that present themselves as law (for
example in the Wrongful life case). Paraphrasing Wittgenstein one
could say: ‘Consider the phenomena we call ‘law’. (…) What is common
to them all? Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they
would not be called ‘law’’ – but look and see whether there is anything
common to all. – For if you look at them you will not see something
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and of whole
series of them at that. (…) I can think of no better expression to charac-
terize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’: (…) law forms a
family’.6 If we follow Wittgenstein’s suggestion – don’t define the law,
but look at it and investigate it – what do we see and find? Is the law
demarcated along tight and neat boundaries, reflecting ontological dif-
5. G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler Verlag 1975, p. 164-170.
6. Wittgenstein, supra, par. 66, 67.
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ferences, as the Grand Old Theories picture it? Or does it resemble a
patchwork of family resemblances of positivistic, idealistic and realistic
dimensions, as the Wrongful life case suggests? Or is law without any
limits whatsoever? What does the Wrongful life case actually show us,
what can we learn from it?
2 Solutions from legal theory
2.1 Law in context
In his study Law in context (1997) William Twining gives us an anec-
dote from the days he lectured private law at the University of Khar-
toum in Sudan. In his lecture he discussed a case in which a visitor of a
zoo had been feeding a camel and had been bitten by the camel. The
question of law was, of course, whether the zoo was liable for the
damage caused. At that time a student raised his hand. The lecturer,
happy with a question, interrupted his lecture to experience the follo-
wing anti-climax. ‘Please, sir’, the student asked, ‘why was the camel in
the zoo?’ This question puts everything in place again. Why was the
camel in the zoo, while they freely walk around in Sudan? What is the
use of lecturing Common Law to an audience to whom the facts of the
case are beyond comprehension? Law cannot be properly understood
outside the context in which it is developed and learned, is Twining’s
conclusion, and he therefore pleads for an approach of law ‘to broaden
the study of law from within’.7 In such a contextualistic approach there
are no standard recipes in law. Lawyers should look for the demands of
the circumstances of the case – ‘pros ton kairon’, in the words of Aris-
totle8 – and adjust their responses accordingly.
In my opinion Twining has a strong case, because the suggested
approach is not one that is arbitrarily chosen, but is itself the result of
relevant developments in law and its study. Let me try to explain this,
starting with the contextualization of law itself. Posner has named this
phenomenon ‘the decline of law as an autonomous discipline’, by
which he refers to the blurring of the sharp boundaries between law,
politics and morality. Let me illustrate this development with examples
from the European context, starting with the demarcation between law
and politics. Influenced by the doctrine of the separation of powers,
7. W. Twining, Law in context. Enlarging a discipline, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997. p. 13.
8. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, edition Amsterdam: Kalias 1997, p. 106 (bk. II, par. 2, 4).
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this demarcation was rather strict until the end of the 19th century. The
content of law was determined by politics, while its shape and enforce-
ment were by and large considered to be the result of doctrinal law.
With the emerging welfare state this clear division blurred, because the
law became an instrument of politics to change society, while at the
same time the judiciary developed new legal standards for politics. As a
result of both tendencies the domain of public law has grown, while its
content became more and more subject of political controversy. The
best example from the Dutch context is offered by the emerging princi-
ples of good governance in administrative law, such as the prohibition
of the misuse of power and of detournement de pouvoir. Though these
principles supply additional legal standards for government, their con-
tent is seriously disputed. Only recently politicians complained that
government is hindered by the fact that these principles of good gover-
nance bring the administrative judiciary too close to the business of
politics.
The relation between private law and morality shows similar develop-
ments. Until the late 19th century, law and morality were strictly sepa-
rated, the law enforcing minimal standards of behavior, leaving the
aspirations and ideals to critical morality. From the 20th century
onwards the boundaries were blurred in two opposite directions; the
moralization of private law, and the legalization of morality. On the one
hand, unwritten norms of a moral character got hold of the central doc-
trines of tort, contract and property. Most of the classics of the Dutch
Supreme Court of the 20th century belong to this category. On the
other hand, more and more social relationships were brought under
the influence of the law, such as those between teacher and student,
parents and children, and doctors and patients (Wrongful life is an
example). Again, the domain of private law has grown, but its norms
are increasingly of a social cum moral nature and are therefore more
disputed.
A telling case from recent years suggests that this development has
come to an end. The case concerned an accident by which a boy named
Jeffrey drowned under unrevealed circumstances after his swimming
therapy in a hospital pool. At the time he was under the supervision of
his mother and a hospital therapist, but neither was in place in time.
The parents did not claim money, however, but asked the court for a
declaration that the hospital was liable, because that would help them
cope with their loss. Should the court give such a moral declaratory
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ruling, even if it has been conceded that the hospital is liable for the
accident? Should the judge become a psychological therapist, instead of
the priest or the psychiatrist? The Dutch Supreme Court denied the
claim, because of a lack of a legitimate interest of the claimants.9 And
that was the end of it.
These examples – however roughly sketched – show that there is every
reason ‘to broaden the study of law from within’ (as Twining has
referred to it). Law cannot be understood properly – as perhaps in the
late 19th century – without reference to politics and morals. Legal dis-
course has been extended far beyond the traditional boundaries and
overlaps the political and the moral discourse. As a matter of fact, in
legal discourse we regularly appeal to moral principles and pragmatic
arguments, besides traditional legal sources. In that sense, law is a
meta-discourse, a discourse on other discourses. We could introduce
the metaphor of demarcation by saying that the traditional legal sour-
ces constitute the inner limits of legal discourse, while principles and
policies mark the outer limits. Most lawyers stay within the inner limits
most of the time, appealing to statutes, precedents, or customary law.
In hard cases, however, when the traditional sources are exhausted, we
do in fact appeal to moral and political arguments; not per se, however,
but as legal arguments. Although we regularly appeal to other discour-
ses than law, in law we do subject them to the limitations of legal dis-
course. After all, legal concepts determine what can be said (and
thought) in law.
As a result, we have to be aware of two possible risks in this regard. On
the one hand there is the risk of losing sight of these limitations. This
is the pitfall of those lawyers who tend to forget the limitations of legal
discourse, who trespass the boundaries of legal discourse unknowingly,
and commit the sins of sheer activism or moralism. They do speak in
law; not as lawyers though, but as activists or moralists. On the other
hand, however, we run the risk of not exhausting the possibilities
because we tend to stay within the inner limits of legal discourse. This
is the pitfall of the lawyers we tend to accuse of legalism, formalism, or
black letter law. Again, they do speak in law, and they even speak as
lawyers, but they do not speak as open-minded lawyers. I will return to
some examples of these pitfalls later on. For now, it suffices to conclude
that the contextual approach of law holds between these two opposites.
9. HR 9 october 1998, NJ 1998, 853 (Jeffrey).
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What, then, are the consequences for the study of law? This question
will be addressed in the next paragraph.
2.2 The interdisciplinary study of law
One of the reasons ‘to broaden the study of law from within’, as Twin-
ing suggested and we investigated, is the contextualization of law itself.
There is another good reason for this approach however, and that is the
contextualization of the study of law (not of law itself). There are, of
course, several ways to illustrate this. In legal theory it is an accepted
proposition that the application of law, or the identification of a legal
proposition, presupposes an interpretation of law. Apart from the facts,
legal disputes are mostly disputes on different interpretations of the
relevant law.10 In hard cases different interpretations of law are suppor-
ted by both parties, each struggling for recognition as the authoritative
interpretation. These diverging interpretations are not always the result
of mistake or bad faith (although they sometimes are), but of different
interests and perspectives of the parties, lawyers and judges involved.
Interpretation is therefore intrinsically interwoven with the argumenta-
tion of different positions.11 Legal reasoning is essentially a practical
syllogism, in wich a case is confronted with arguments deduced from
experience, and which results in a provisional solution. As Stephen
Toulmin has shown us, this line of reasoning is always defeasible, that
is, it can always be annulled by adding new information.12 In this sense
it differs from theoretical reasoning, which indeed has the potential to
lead to certain and objective conclusions (given the premises). As a
domain of practical reason, law lacks this comfortable certainty, leaving
its practitioners to find their way in daily practice with no other means
than experience and practical wisdom.
As we saw in the Wrongful life case, judges appeal to principles and
policies in their reasoning, beyond the appeal to more traditional legal
sources. And as we argued before, these appeals are subject to the pos-
sibilities and limitations of legal discourse. If these observations hold,
then this has implications for the nature of legal knowledge. We tend to
consider ‘thinking like a lawyer’ as deliberating on positive law, that is,
the traditional legal sources. If we take the suggestion ‘to broaden the
10. R. Dworkin, Law’s empire, Harvard and Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press
1986, p. 1-30.
11. P. Ricoeur, The just, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 2000, p. 109-127.
12. S. Toulmin, The uses of argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1958, p. 107-
113, p. 118-122, p. 141-145.
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study of law from within’ seriously, however, then this is not enough
and the legal student should come to learn to think like a sociologist, an
economist, or a psychologist as well (compare the Jeffrey case). Or, per-
haps, we should say that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ includes thinking like
all these other professionals. A lawyer who understands law in its con-
text will never restrict herself to the strictly legal domain, but will inte-
grate sociological, economic, or psychological expertise. The professio-
nal knowledge of a lawyer extends beyond the strictly legal and will
overlap with other disciplines. Also in this epistemological sense, law is
a discourse on other discourses. In her day-to-day work a lawyer is, at
the same time, to some extent an engineer, or an accountant, etc. Not
in the sense that she can replace their expertise, for example as an
expert witness, but in the sense that she is capable of analyzing the pro-
blem into its different aspects and redressing them on their own
merits. Again, just like in speaking the legal language, we should rea-
lize that this knowledge is applied in a legal context and is therefore
subject to the limitations of law and legal discourse. At the end of the
day, these elements have to be integrated in one legal judgment. One
could even say, perhaps, that it is the particular expertise of the lawyer
to integrate all these different kinds of knowledge in a legal judgment.
Similarly, a legal scholar who understands law in its context will not
restrict herself to legal dogmatics in the strict sense, but will include
history, literature, anthropology, etc. A contextual approach is necessa-
rily an inclusive one, resulting in the interdisciplinary study of law.
In a similar tone of voice, James Boyd White has discussed the nature
of the interdisciplinary study of law when he combatted ‘doctrine in a
vacuum’ in legal education and pleaded for an interdisciplinary train-
ing. Such a training is not one of ‘law and sociology’, ‘law and eco-
nomy’, or ‘law and psychology’, White argues, but one of ‘law as (all
these other things)’. ‘This is a different view of interdisciplinary work
from the usual models’, he writes, ‘for we are not interested in transla-
ting findings or even methods from one field to another; rather, in this
kind of work each of the disciplines would be looked at as I suggest law
should be looked at: as a language, an activity, and with an eye both to
its special resources and to its limits’.13 Put differently, ‘thinking like a
lawyer’ implies thinking like all the others and training in the first
should therefore encompass the latter. Not by imitating the sociologist,
economist or psychologist, but by being aware of the sociologist, econo-
mist and psychologist elements in law. After all, Twining wanted ‘to
13. J. Boyd White, From expectation to experience, essays on law and legal education, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press 1999, p. 22.
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broaden the study of law from within’ (not from outside). A contextualist
approach in law, therefore, implies more than just adding some social
circumstances in our thinking and acting in law; it presupposes the
capacity to switch perspectives, in the full awareness of the possibilities
and limitations of each of the positions chosen (first and foremost the
legal one). Contextualism is necessarily connected with perspectivism.
There is no such thing as a ‘view from nowhere’ (in the words of Tho-
mas Nagel14), but only an observation from the viewpoint of the obser-
ver. Every observation presupposes a blind spot, which is the context
which cannot be observed from the standpoint taken. One has to step
aside to observe the blind spot, thus creating a new one.
2.3 Alternative theories of private law
In this contextualistic approach of private law, its limits then are fluid
and constantly changing, depending on context and perspective. Are
any alternatives available? There are two I can think of, and I name
them ‘back to dogmatics’ and ‘forward to policies’ respectively. I hope to
show that they represent extremes that should be avoided, since they
commit the sins of respectively underexploiting legal discourse and
trespassing the boundaries of legal discourse that we discussed before.
The position taken here represents a middle position that, at least in
my view, avoids the pitfalls of the alternatives while combining their
advantages.
First, then, the programme of ‘back to dogmatics’, for which I take
Weinrib’s views to be exemplary. Weinrib is concerned with the under-
standing of private law, his claim being that private law is to be under-
stood in its own terms (and not in terms of its purpose). In Weinrib’s
view, private law is a self-understanding enterprise, that is, it is simulta-
neously explanandum and explanans, both an object and a mode of
understanding. Thus understood, the idea of private law is considered
to be a synthesis of three theses, namely formalism (the understanding
of private law through its structure), corrective justice (the specification
of this structure), and a Kantian notion of rights (the moral standpoint
immanent in this structure).15 In Weinrib’s view, private law is autono-
mous, and he rejects any ‘law and…’ approach as resulting in either
reductionism or an infinite regress. Though he acknowledges that law
14. T. Nagel, The view from nowhere, New York (NY) and Oxford (England): Oxford University
Press 1986.
15. E.J. Weinrib, The idea of private law, Cambridge (Mass.) and London (England): Harvard
University Press 1995, p. 11-19.
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can be understood in terms of its history, sociology or economy, the
understanding of law in its own terms – i.e. legal dogmatics in its
purest form – is the only legitimate approach of law.
On the other hand, there is the ‘forward to policies’ program, for which
I take Richard Posner’s ideas to be exemplary. Posner offers a pragma-
tist program that is practical, instrumental, forward-looking, activist,
empirical, skeptical and anti-dogmatic and experimental.16 Posner’s
pragmatism is quite the opposite of Weinrib’s formalism. For Posner,
his law-and-economics program introduces in law the ethics of scienti-
fic inquiry, because economics is the instrumental science par excel-
lence. Modern economics offers the theoretical framework for the
empirical research in law. The economic analysis of law therefore
denies law’s autonomy; legal rules are viewed in instrumental terms.
Both law and legal rules are analyzed in terms of means to achieve cer-
tain ends, be it wealth maximization or something else. Its moral con-
cern is to serve the welfare of the non-legal community. Law itself is
considered to be a mechanism for social control, to be replaced by
more effective ones as soon as they are available. Legal dogmatics in its
current form is pretentious, prejudiced and uninformed, Posner con-
cludes, and should be replaced by a more pragmatic program.
This is not the time and place to redress both programs on their own
merits, but I do want to make the point that the proposed ‘law in con-
text’ approach holds middle floor between both opposites. In the most
abstract terms, the comparison can be framed like this. Like Weinrib’s
program, the ‘law in context’ approach acknowledges a certain auto-
nomy for law and legal dogmatics, though it does take into account the
increasing importance of mutual influences between law and its con-
texts. There is no reason whatsoever to ban approaches that focus on
law in context, though we should not forget that external influences are
integrated into law. That is why we prefered the expression ‘law as
(etcetera)’ above ‘law and (etcetera)’, since the former expresses this
need for integration in law better than the latter. Like Posner’s pro-
gram, ours acknowledges that law cannot be understood properly wit-
hout taking its context into account (economics included), though we
should not reduce law to economics. Not only because there are other
legitimate perspectives, but also because law cannot be understood pro-
perly in purely instrumental terms since it has and expresses values of
16. R.A. Posner, Overcoming law, Cambridge (Mass.) and London (England): Harvard Univer-
sity Press 1995, p. 11-15.
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its own. For that reason law cannot be made instrumental to any politi-
cal purpose whatsoever; some purposes are simply contradictory to
law’s own values, such as the principles of legal certainty, justice and
purpose, distinguished by Radbruch.
‘Law in context’ then is preferable to ‘back to dogmatics’ and ‘forward
to policies’. In the first place, because it holds the promise of better law
than the alternatives. It is my conviction that contextualists do better as
lawyers than formalists and activists, both with respect to the develop-
ment of law and the judgment of cases. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly in this context, because it provides us with a better understan-
ding of law than the accounts of Weinrib and Posner do. Law is neither
a mere instrument for policy, nor an island in itself; it is a social prac-
tice with semi-autonomous language, methods and values. The under-
standing of law then should not be merely reductionist or self-referring
– as in the accounts of Posner and Weinrib – but should give insight
into its relations with the different contexts in which it is developed and
applied. ‘Law in context’ offers just that.
3 Philosophical foundations
3.1 The rise and decline of modernism
We have already seen that the ‘law in context’ approach fits recent
developments in law better than its alternatives. Now I would like to
show that the interdisciplinary study of law fits recent developments in
philosophy better as well. For this purpose, I want to sketch the bigger
picture of the history of ideas that underpins our discussion and that is
often referred to as modernism. For Stephen Toulmin, the rise and
decline of modernism can be sketched as a pendulum which brings
our presentday postmodernism back to the intellectual heritage of 16th
century Renaissance.17 In between lies the epoch of modernism which
lasted from the end of the 17th century to the end of the 19th century
and which is characterized by what John Dewey has referred to as ‘the
quest for certainty’.18 This phrase was used by Dewey to express that
man – looking for certainty – is inclined to prefer theoretical reason
17. S. Toulmin, Cosmopolis: the hidden agenda of modernity, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press 1990.
18. J. Dewey, The quest for certainty, volum IV: 1929, J.A. Boydston (ed.), Carbondale/Edwards-
ville 1988.
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over practical reason. Theoretical reason, then, is the domain of
thought, universality, certainty, stability and rationality, while practical
reason is the domain of action, contingency, uncertainty, flexibility and
reasonableness. One of the purposes of Deweys pragmatism was to res-
tore the balance between the domains of thought and action, which
meant a restoration of the Aristotelean insight that the degree of exact-
ness of a discipline or activity is dependent on its subject.19 ‘Different
methods for different topics’, as Toulmin summarized, which means a
return to the ‘World of Where and When, a world in which everything
we say refers to a particular time and place, without claiming any
abstract, universal validity’.20 This return to contextualism at the begin-
ning of the 20th century was a symptom of the decline of modernism,
the roots of which go back to the Renaissance of the 16th century.
The rise of modernism started around 1650, when the Peace Treaty of
West Phalia ended the religious wars by dividing Europe into fixed
nation states. At the same time scientists like Newton changed the pic-
ture of the universe beyond recognition, describing it as a clock in
which every event was connected through lawlike causal generaliza-
tions. Starting with Descartes, philosophy became fascinated with
three dreams: the dream of a unified science (Newton), a unified
method (Descartes), and a unified language (Leibniz). This ‘quest for
certainty’ also had its impact on social thinking. Political philosophy
changed from the art of politics from Machiavelli to the picture of
society as a construction sketched by the social contract philosophers
(Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke). Ethics developed from the art of casuistry
it had been since Aristotle – acting ‘pros ton kairon’, as the circumstan-
ces demand – to the quest for a categorical imperative in the work of
Kant. Even legal thinking did not escape the demands of the time. The
legal humanistic perspective on Roman law as a series of texts gave way
to the idea of Roman law as ‘ratio scripta’, which is exemplified in the
work of Grotius (‘On the law of war and peace’). In general, the rise of
Modernism shows a shift from practical to theoretical reason, from
humanism to rationalism, from rhetoric to logic. In its heydays, moder-
nist thinking can be characterized by two distinct but connected ideas.
Firstly, there was a picture of language as a representation of the world,
presupposing a correspondence between word and world. Wittgen-
stein’s ‘picture theory of meaning’ was one of the most important pre-
19. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ibidem.
20. S. Toulmin, Return to reason, Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Press
2001, p. 96, 192.
Hofstra.fm  Page 18  Wednesday, January 9, 2008  1:57 PM
Limits of private law 19
requisites of objective knowledge. Secondly, scientific knowledge was
considered to be in need of indisputable justification, whether in self-
evident axioms (rationalism) or in objective observations (empiricism).
This ideal of objective knowledge could not be realized in the social
sciences, which from then on were considered to be suspect, soft, and
unreliable. Law, of course, shared in this judgment.
At the end of the 19th century the tide turned. The nation states eroded
and became involved again in great wars. New scientists like Einstein
and Bohr developed theories that seriously put into question the pic-
ture of the universe as an organized clockwork. Wittgenstein in his
later work demolished the picture theory of meaning, leaving us with
the idea of language as a variety of games, played according to different
rules. Logical positivism was the last attempt to find a foundation for
objective knowledge but failed. ‘The totality of our so-called knowledge
or beliefs’, Willard Van Orman Quine wrote, ‘from the most casual
matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic
physics or even pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric
which impinges on experience only along the edges’.21 The German
philosopher Hans Albert showed why the search for objective knowle-
dge had to end in an infinite regress, a circle, or a dogma; a trilemma
named after the famous Baron Von Münchhausen who was not able to
pull himself up from the swamp by his own wig.22 The modernist pro-
ject appeared to be an illusion, and the French philosopher Lyotard pro-
claimed the end of ‘the Great Stories of Enlightenment’. The question
remains, of course, where this leaves us.
The rise and decline of modernity has been marked by poets. At the
beginning of modernity in 1611 John Donne wrote the following lines
in his poem The anatomy of the world: ‘T’is all in peeces, all cohaerence
gone’. At the end of modernity, shortly after the first World War, Yeats
wrote: ‘Things fall apart: the centre cannot hold’. Postmodernism star-
ted, as modernism did, with a widespread feeling of crisis, both in
science and society. Some philosophers supported this feeling with a
conviction that – now that nothing is certain – ‘anything goes’ (Feiera-
bend). Toulmin, on the contrary, pleads for a restoration of the huma-
nist ideals of the 16th century Renaissance. The values of humanity,
tolerance, reasonableness seem perfectly fit to countervail the diversity,
21. W. Van Orman Quine, ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’, in: From a logical point of view, logico-
philosophical essays, New York: Harpertorch books 1953, 1961, p. 42.
22. H. Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft, Tübingen 1975.
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ambiguity and uncertainty of our days. The end of the Great Stories of
the Enlightenment marks – in his view – a return to the practical wis-
dom, modesty and sceptical tolerance of the Renaissance or – put diffe-
rently – a humanization of modernism. This is an appealing program
with consequences for philosophy (a return to practical philosophy), for
science (different standards for different disciplines), and for politics (a
moderated pragmatism as antidote to absolutist thought, from what-
ever origin or source). In any case, it shifts the pendulum back from
theoretical reason to practical reason, from rationality to humanity, and
from logic to rhetoric. The circle is round. We are back to where we
started. But what does all this mean for the study of law?
3.2 Private law as a battlefield
Private law belongs – along with medicine and theology – to the eldest
disciplines. In fact, the history of the university started in the 11th cen-
tury in Bologna with the rediscovery and the study of the Codex Iuris
Civilis of Justinianus. From then onwards private law has always been –
with variations in focus and method – the study of authoritative texts to
solve cases. Private lawyers pretty much stuck to their methods, when
science and technology emerged in the 17th century. Since the 18th
century the study of society began to evolve and resulted in a process of
‘Ausdifferenzierung’ of the various social sciences out of the shadow of
the law. Economics emerged from the administration of government,
political economy, and a new focus on the empirical effects of the law
(Marx). Anthropology took its starting point in the study of law and
legal practice in newly discovered cultures (Maine). The founding
fathers of sociology took an interest in the process of modernization in
which law (like religion) played an important role (Durkheim, Weber).
It is noteworthy that all the pioneers mentioned were lawyers by educa-
tion; it was a new way of looking at law and society that started these
new disciplines. Next, it was a process of specialization – stimulated by
external factors – that facilitated the development into separate, autono-
mous disciplines. This process of specialisation has, of course, advanta-
ges and disadvantages. On the one hand it focuses the necessary atten-
tion to make any progress whatsoever, on the other hand it forces one
to bracket off different procedures, methods or perspectives, thus stim-
ulating selective blindness. ‘Selective attention is one thing’, Toulmin
writes however, ‘blinders are another’.23 I will try to illustrate this later
23. Toulmin, Return to reason, supra, p. 42, 43.
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on. For now, it suffices to conclude that the demarcation between legal
dogmatics and the other social sciences is a contingent matter.
As a result of these developments, the study of private law is a battle-
field. On the surface it has developed rather quietly since the days of its
birth, the main development being the transition from a Ius Commune
to national codified private law in the early 19th century with the emer-
gence of the nation states, and now with their erosion back to a Euro-
pean private law. Beneath the surface however, there is a lot more going
on. First, the separation between the Natural Sciences and the Huma-
nities – ‘The Two Cultures’, as C.P. Snow24 put it – left its traces in pri-
vate law too. Not only in topics of substantive law (like causation), but
also in method. Traditional legal dogmatics has found its home in the
Humanities, but from time to time ideals and devices are borrowed
from the sciences. I mention a few examples without pretending to be
complete: Langdell’s legal formalism, Von Savigny’s Begriffsjurispru-
denz, Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre, Hart’s analytical jurisprudence. These
and other movements in (private) law shared an inspiration in science,
which manifested itself in the ideals of objective knowledge, a rational
method, order and system in law, and a strict separation between law
and politics/law and morals.25 As such they were nearly always followed
by a reaction in the form of a turn to society: legal formalism by Hol-
mes’s legal realism, Begriffsjurisprudenz by Interessenjurisprudenz, the
analytical movement by the critical legal studies, etcetera.26 Again we
hit upon a pendulum, this one located in private law, going back and
forth between system and society, logic and experience, technique and
policy. This movement had a large impact, not only on the study of pri-
vate law, but also on the practice and content of private law itself.
Next, there is the differentiation in different disciplines which has not
left the study of private law untouched. Paradoxically, the early differen-
tiation of the social sciences from law confirmed the core of the study
of private law in its dogmatic, practice-oriented approach of law. It sti-
mulated a professional ideology that legal dogmatics sticks to positive
law and its application in cases, leaving out the rest. Let me try to
explain this, explicating some of the ‘blinders’ I mentioned before.
24. C.P. Snow, ‘The two cultures and the scientific revolution’, in: Public affairs, New York:
Charles Scribner’s sons 1971, p. 13-47.
25. K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, Berlin: Springer Verlag 1979, p. 1-165.
26. A. Hunt, The sociological movement in law, London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press
1978.
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With regard to its subject matter from the start legal dogmatics has
been a study of authoritative texts, taking these texts as the sources of
positive law. In limiting itself to texts, legal dogmatics has left practice
to the social sciences. To fill the gap between the study of law and the
social sciences in the late 20th century bridging (sub) disciplines emer-
ged, such as sociology of law, anthropology of law, psychology of law,
etcetera. A peculiar development, if one realises that sociology, anthro-
pology, psychology and the others emerged from the study of law in the
first place. This restriction to texts is one blinder of legal dogmatics, but
not the only one. With regard to the purpose of the study of law I
already mentioned that it has always been dedicated to cases, using
authoritative texts as the loci for arguments in legal dispute. As such it
operates between law and case, text and context, logic and experience.
Legal dogmatics has thus always played an important social role,
though at the expense of the formation of theory, which was left to
other disciplines. With regard to the method legal dogmatics has always
stayed close to text-analytical methods – whether the scholastic method,
philology or hermeneutics – thus leaving the use of empirical methods
to other disciplines. These limitations make us aware that legal dogma-
tics has always been a limited enterprise: it restricted itself to positive
law for pleading and solving cases, by using analytical methods on
authoritative texts. This is legal dogmatics in the proper sense.27 As
such, it has left empirical research into legal practice and the formation
of theory to other social (sub)sciences. Legal dogmatics has thus both
defined law and its context, restricting itself to the former, and leaving
the latter to other disciplines. Again, the study of law and thereby the
definition of law itself appear to be a contingent matter.
Legal dogmatics has its own reasons, of course, to suggest differently.
The authority of its expertise is underlined by the suggestion that its
subject matter, purpose and method are somehow ‘given’, thus resul-
ting in the exclusion of different approaches to the study of law. As
mentioned before, this focus is beneficial for the growth of knowledge
within the given paradigm, but this is achieved at the cost of bracketing
off different approaches and perspectives. In their day-to-day work
however, legal scholars find themselves often referring to the demands
of ‘practice’, which is an often used and sometimes misused expres-
sion. Sometimes it refers to the principles or policies involved, at other
times to (aspects) of the context of the case, and again at other times to
27. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, supra, p. 204.
Hofstra.fm  Page 22  Wednesday, January 9, 2008  1:57 PM
Limits of private law 23
the particular preferrences of the scholar. At this point my plea for a
‘law in context’ approach comes in, not as a radical alternative for the
existing practice of legal dogmatics, but as a way of conceptualizing the
appeal to ‘practice’. Does it refer to a calculation of consequences, to the
social circumstances of parties involved, to the principles and policies
lurking in the background of positive law, or to some other relevant
context? This question can only be answered by changing perspective –
from legal dogmatics to the economics, sociology, psychology or history
of law – not to end up finding ourselves in a different discipline, but to
integrate this perspective in our own legal discourse. In its daily life,
law is – besides everything else – economics, sociology, psychology, his-
tory, literature, etcetera. Why then do we not integrate these perspecti-
ves in the study of law? The interdisciplinary study of law – properly
understood – is meant to improve the study of law and thus to enhance
our understanding of the law, no more, no less. What does that mean
for the private lawyer’s expertise? We will address this question in the
next paragraph.
3.3 The private lawyer’s expertise
In private law, as in other disciplines, our picture of professional
knowledge has long been dictated by the model of technical rationality.
According to this model professional knowledge is nothing more, or
less for that matter, than the application of scientific knowledge, like a
kind of technology. This model fits positivistic premises, of course,
since it pillars on the characteristic positivist separation of means and
ends, facts and values. In law, it served the purpose of the separation of
‘law as it is’ and ‘law as it ought to be’, the latter being the domain of
the politician or the moralist, and the former being that of the lawyer.
In legal theory, it has found expression in the movements of legalism,
formalism, the case method of Langdell, and Von Savigny’s Begriffs-
jurisprudenz. In practice however, the model of technical rationality ser-
ved a specific need for the justification of professional practice. The rise
of positivism in the 19th century demarcated a shift from a ‘legitimacy
of character’ to a ‘legitimacy of technique’; the privileges of the profes-
sion were no longer justified by the social position, honour, and the
authority and character of its practitioners (their courage, wisdom,
responsibility), but by the application of objective and rational scientific
techniques.28 Weber has framed this shift in the social domain as one
from charismatic authority (depending on the person of the authority)
28. A. Abbott, The system of professions, an essay on the division of expert labor, Chicago and Lon-
don; Chicago University Press 1988, p. 184-195.
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to authority on legal and rational grounds (depending on the methods
used).29
Since the decline of positivism however, this model of professional
practice has been discredited, both for intellectual and social reasons.
Socially, we have lost our appreciation for technocrats who instrumen-
tally apply their scientific expertise for whatever purposes. The 20th
century offers plenty of examples to justify this discontent. Intellec-
tually, we have come to a different and more complex understanding of
what it takes to participate in professional practice. Let me try to
express that understanding by comparing the expertise of a private
lawyer with that of a private legal scholar. Three differences come into
view. The first is that the body of professional knowledge of lawyers
practising in the field of private law is organized differently, not accor-
ding to the principle of logical coherence, but according to that of prac-
tical utility. She is not so much interested in the system of private law,
of course, as well as its use-based organization. Secondly, the professio-
nal knowledge of the private lawyer has a larger component of practical
knowledge than that of the private law scholar, while the latter has a lar-
ger component of theoretical knowledge. On the difference between
theoretical and practical knowledge, ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’,
‘epistèmè’ and ‘phronèsis’ (as Aristotle would say), there is a vast
amount of literature, that I will not discuss here.30 For now, it suffices
to say that the first is conceptual, propositional knowledge, while the
latter is of a perceptual and dispositional nature. For that reason, practi-
cal knowledge is partly ‘personal knowledge’, as Michael Polanyi would
have it, or ‘tacit knowledge’.31 A practitioner usually knows more than
she can tell. From both the first and the second difference, it follows
that the professional knowledge of the private lawyer has a larger moral
component than that of the private legal scholar. The practitioner
knows better what to do under what circumstances, not only from a
legal point of view but also from a moral point of view. In fact, it is part
of her expertise to know what to do when in private law, as it is the
scholar’s expertise to fit and explain this solution in terms of the system
of private law. These differences are there, not to be neglected, though
they do not deny the connections between both types of expertise, as
29. M. Weber, The theory of social and economic organization, New York: the Free Press 1964,
p. 328.
30. G. Ryle, The concept of mind, New York: Penguin Books 1980, p. 28-32.
31. M. Polanyi, Personal knowledge, towards a post-critical philosophy, Chicago and London: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press 1958, 1962.
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the private lawyer and the private legal scholar would confirm. What
they deny, though, is that the relation between both types of knowing is
simply one of application, as the model of technical rationality would
have it.
The private lawyer’s expertise, then, is far more inclusive than we are
inclined to think. It encompasses knowledge and competences, of a
legal, moral or some other kind, both explicit and implicit belonging to
the lawyers’ repertoire. In a case like the Wrongful life case, for
example, the Dutch Supreme Court considered not only the legal
issues, but also the moral grounds of the different options, as well as
their expected consequences. This includes moral wisdom, legal inter-
pretation, financial calculation of the consequences, and a feeling of
empathy with the parties, especially baby Kelly’s parents. In doing so,
the judges appeal to different contexts of the case, bringing their moral,
economic, psychological and other experiences to the job. To get these
different contexts into view the judge has to change perspective, subse-
quently taking a legal, moral, economic or other perspective, and even-
tually integrating them into one decision that fits and justifies the law
at stake.
Now compare this way of proceeding with the alternatives: excluding
non-legal elements from the decision, and following policies of one’s
own preference. In my view, the contextualistic approach promises
more informed, and therefore better law. Now let us switch to the legal
scholar. For the private law scholar who is trying to make sense of the
ruling, there is not much difference. When she tries to understand the
ruling, she can of course neglect all the expertise that does not fit into
the model of legal dogmatics as a selfsufficient enterprise (as Weinrib’s
scholar would do). In my view, she would thus make poor sense of the
ruling and she would not do justice to the court. On the other hand, she
can try to reconstruct the ruling as an attempt to realize some predeter-
mined extra-legal policy or goal (as Posner’s legal scholar would do).
Again, I think she would misunderstand the ruling and would not do
justice to the court. Instead of both these options, she could also try to
review the ruling from different perspectives, alternatively taking the
moral, financial, psychological and legal aspects into account. In other
words, she could try to study the ruling in different contexts, thus brin-
ging different kinds of expertise to the job. At the end of the day she
will attempt to integrate these different kinds of expertise in a coherent
understanding of the case, expressing her views on what the court has
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ruled and what this ruling attributes to the law. Of course, she may fail
in doing so, but at least she has tried to come to a better understanding
of the law than the available alternatives can provide.
4 Back to law
4.1 Integrity in law, and in lawyers too
So far we have argued the need for switching perspectives by taking dif-
ferent contexts into account, both in the practice and in the study of
law. This approach holds the promise of better informed law as well as
a more comprehensive understanding of legal practice. To fulfill this
promise it is not enough to compare these different perspectives, we
mentioned in passing, we really have to integrate them into our prac-
tice or understanding of the law. For James Boyd White this means that
we have to put them together in something new that changes our
understanding of the composite parts. ‘As lawyers we cannot simply
accept the conclusions of others; we must make them our own, and to
do that we must move out of the legal culture and into the other one.’32
For White, this process is very similar to that of the translation of texts,
not as a simple substitution of words, but in the sense of creating a new
discourse of meaning. In law itself this process is exemplified by the
way the expertise of expert witnesses is integrated in legal deliberation
and judgment. Forensic and psychiatric expertise is transformed into a
legal judgment, but not without mutual influence and transformation.
In the study of law, bridge-disciplines like the sociology or psychology
of law illustrate the same point; their best practices are not to be consi-
dered as an application of sociological or psychological theory to law,
nor as mere examples of legal imperialism, but as a contribution to
new ways of looking, talking and knowing.
In cases of integration of non-legal knowledge it is of course harder to
pass Ronald Dworkin’s integrity test than when we integrate just
another legal case. Law as integrity requires an interpretive attitude; a
specific case is interpreted as the best possible continuation of legal
practice, thus fitting as well as justifying the practice as a whole. For
legal cases this means that they are interpreted as an exemplification of
the principles and values lurking behind legal rules and precedents.
32. J. Boyd White, Justice as translation: an essay in cultural and legal criticism, Chicago and Lon-
don, University of Chicago Press 1990, p. 14.
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The question is then: what is the best realization of these principles
and values in this case? The answer to this question may, as we know,
even contradict accepted interpretations of legal rules and precedents
(contra legem).33 Now, what happens if we try to integrate originally
‘non-legal’ knowledge in the body of legal knowledge, as in the examp-
les given? The metaphor of translation sets us on the right track, since
it makes us aware that intellectual integration is a matter of bridging
cultures, that is, of languages, methods, and values. Take the example
of a legal scholar and a scientist engaging in interdisciplinary research.
They may be tempted to conceptualize the obstacles they encounter as
differences in idiom, method, and values. The gap between their cultu-
res almost seems unbridgeable then. Idioms cannot be translated wit-
hout loss of meaning, different methods determine a different outlook,
and both are in the end reducible to diverging beliefs and attitudes. Is
there no way, then, to escape this fragmentation in our disciplines?
There is, and in my view it can be phrased like this. The crucial step is
getting to learn to recognize the foreign elements in our own culture
and thus (mirrorwise) the characteristic elements in our own culture.
What does the law do with forensic or scientific evidence? And what
does that teach us about the legal outlook itself? How does the law con-
ceptualize human relations, and what can we conclude about legal con-
cepts? How do we strike the balance between the demands of safety
and traditional liberty rights, and what does it tell us about these
rights? How does the Dutch Supreme Court in the ruling of baby Kelly
appeal to the moral principle of the dignity of human life? And what
does that tell us about the relationship between law and morality? Such
questions really draw our attention to interdisciplinary research, since
they redress the foundations of our own discipline as well. In law and
its study, as in daily life, the communication with other practices can-
not but influence our own practices. This is what intellectual integra-
tion is all about; a slow and tough development of our own culture in
the continuous contact with others, thereby opening new horizons, at
the same time closing others.
The attempt to remedy fragmentation can be taken one step further, as
a struggle against the fragmentation in ourselves. For this, we should
start to consider diverging bodies of knowledge or conceptual frame-
works as different communities thinking and talking. In the words of
33. R. Dworkin, Law’s empire, Cambridge (Massachussetts): Harvard University Press 1986,
p. 225-276.
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James Boyd White: ‘We should conceive of the relevant world as a world
of people talking to each other across their discourses, out of their lan-
guages, out of their communities of knowledge and expertise, and
speaking as people seeking to be whole. We should try to write that way
ourselves’.34 Engaging in interdisciplinary research entails communica-
tion with representatives of other disciplines, getting to know their way
of speaking and thinking, and thus (again, mirrorwise) getting to know
ourselves, as lawyers. As such it exemplifies the old Socratic wisdom in
modern disguise: know thyself, as a lawyer. Self-knowledge cannot but
serve a therapeutic purpose as well. The interdisciplinary study of law is
not only a remedy for the fragmentation in law and our understanding
of it, it is also a remedy for the fragmentation in ourselves. Changing
perspective draws from different sources in us, restoring our blinders,
fighting professional deformation and leaving us as richer and more
competent lawyers; not only and perhaps not even primarily because of
our expertise, but at least as much because of our imagination. The
continuous contact with different perspectives and other disciplines
therefore not only makes us better lawyers, but perhaps even better per-
sons. After all, integrity not only characterizes legal systems, but people
as well.
4.2 Wrongful life re-addressed
Let us, finally, re-address the Wrongful life case with which we started.
In the light of what has been said thus far it can be considered to be a
serious attempt to integrate a moral perspective into the legal one,
since it explicitly appeals to the principle of the dignity of human life.
As such it deserves our praise. Faced with the moral nature of the issue
at stake, the Dutch Supreme Court is not satisfied with taking the safe
road, that is, an appeal to the legal sources. The Court apparently also
wants to judge the issue on its own merits, thus trying to contribute to
a public debate about a controversial matter. The Court chooses for
itself a specific ethos, as a moral guide in a pluralistic society. Of course
the members of the Court would never admit to this, but it suggests the
ambition to play a social role like a ‘philosopher-king’ as distinguished
by Plato. The question is whether the judiciary is equipped to fulfil the
function of a moral compass in matters of substantial justice in a
morally divided society. It may well be, as Sunstein remarks, that: ‘Like
all of us, judges have limited time and capacities, and like almost all of
us, judges are not trained as philosophers’.35
34. Ibidem, p. 20.
35. Cass R. Sunstein, One case at a time, judicial minimalism on the Supreme Court, Cambridge
(Mass.)/London: Harvard University Press 1999, p. 249.
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Has the attempt of the Supreme Court to integrate a moral perspective
into its ruling in the case of baby Kelly been successful then? In my opi-
nion, the answer is negative. The Supreme Court undertook to investi-
gate whether or not sustaining the claim for compensation of the
parents of baby Kelly (both on their own accord and in the name of
Kelly) would constitute a violation of the principle of the dignity of
human life. The Supreme Court addresses this question no less than
three times – in the context of its squashing of several defenses of the
defendants – showing a gradual inclining integration of this argument
in the motivation of its ruling. Let us analyze the argument closer. First,
the Court states that the implicit recognition of the birth of a handicap-
ped child as ‘damage’ – in establishing a causal relation between the
midwife’s fault and the damage of the claimants – does not imply any
judgment whatsoever on the value of that child as a person or its exi-
stence (consideration 4.4). The argument is not yet integrated in the
motivation here, it is more or less added as a loose remark, an obiter
dictum. Second, the Court states that sustaining the parents’ claim for
immaterial damage – which is the decision of the Court in this context
– does not imply that the child is a source of grief to them, but rests
exclusively on the judgment that the midwife’s fault infringes funda-
mental rights of the parents (consideration 4.10). The Court seems to
suggest a specific reading of its own decision here; we should see it as a
consequence of the fault, not as a judgment on the meaning of the life
of the child. The argument is therefore better integrated here, than in
its first use. Even more integrated is the third occasion of use, when the
Supreme Court deals with the defense that the damage cannot be deter-
mined, since if the fault would not have been committed, baby Kelly
would not have been born at all. The Court rejects this defense on the
legal ground that the damage should be estimated in a case like this.
Sustaining this claim does not in any way imply that the existence of
Kelly should be valued lower than her non-existence, the Court argues,
but rests on the recognition of the unlawfulness of the acts by the mid-
wife and the hospital. Holding them liable does not infringe Kelly’s dig-
nity, the Court concludes, but, on the contrary, facilitates her – as far as
money ever can – to lead a human life (consideration 4.15). Here the
argument is most fully integrated, because the Court finally provides a
reason why the principle of human dignity is not infringed. But is it a
good reason?
I do not think so. Although it looks plausible enough – at first sight it
even looks like a truism – it changes the nature of the argument it
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seeks to refute. First, it addresses not so much human dignity in an
abstract sense – as it was put forward by the opponents – but the dig-
nity of this specific existence, the life of baby Kelly. Next, human
dignity does not function as a ground for the judgment – as it was used
by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (‘Die Verpflichtung aller staatlichen
Gewalt, jedem Menschen in seinem Dasein un seiner selbst willen zu
achten (…), verbietet es, die Unterhaltsplicht für ein Kind als Schaden
zu begreifen’) – but as a goal of the ruling (the possibilities for Kelly to
lead a human life). As a result, the appeal to human dignity has been
transformed from an argument of principle to a pragmatic argument.36
In short, the Supreme Court did succeed in integrating this moral
argument in its ruling, but not without a fundamental transformation
of its nature. Is this a serious flaw? I think it is, for two reasons. First, it
misses the point of the argument of the opponents. Nobody in his right
mind will deny that compensation for damage will put baby Kelly in a
better position to lead a human life, but that was not the argument of
the opponents. Their argument was that doing this will infringe the
principle of the dignity of human life, and this still holds true. Besides,
the argument of the Supreme Court justifies too much. The proposi-
tion that compensation for damage will put the victim in a better posi-
tion to lead a human life is valid for almost any medical liability claim.
In fact, the Court confines itself to a policy of victim protection.37
5 Conclusion
Starting with the ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court in the Wrongful
life case we asked ourselves: what constitutes the limits of private law?
The Grand Old Theories defined fixed limits, as we mentioned, but
they do not fit the growing complexity of law practice today. So we
changed our strategy and asked ourselves what law actually shows us.
At closer inspection we found that it shows a patchwork of characteris-
tics or family resemblances, in different combinations in changing cir-
cumstances. The Wrongful life case is just one example of a hard case,
in which the Dutch Supreme Court explicitly appeals to a moral princi-
36. P.S. Attyah, From principles to pragmatism, changes in the function of the judicial process and
the law, an inaugural lecture, delivered before the University of Oxford on 17th february
1978, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978.
37. The line of reasoning followed here is borrowed from an earlier publication: M.A. Loth,
‘Engaged in a search for justice, over grenzeloze aansprakelijkheid en de moeizame inte-
gratie van een moreel principe’, in: Onrechtmatig leven? Opstellen naar aanleiding van baby
Kelly, M. Buijsen (red.), Nijmegen: Valkhof pers 2006, p. 40-47.
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ple and empirical effects to justify its ruling (besides the traditional
appeal to legal sources). As such, it is a perfect illustration of the way
the positivistic, idealistic and pragmatic dimensions of private law
interrelate.
What specific legal theory then offers the best account of the current
practice of private law? In this book it is argued that the ‘law in context’
approach offers the best possible theory, both in terms of fit and in
terms of justification of current legal practice. First, it does justice to
the most prominent developments in law itself in the 20th century,
which can be characterized as a ‘contextualization’ of the legal system
(by which we refer to the blurring distinctions between law, politics,
and morality). Second, it seems a perfectly natural consequence of the
developments in the study of law, which have resulted in a prominent
position for the interdisciplinary study of law. Third, both seem per-
fectly natural consequences of more general, philosophical develop-
ments, as our sketch of the rise and decline of modernism attempted to
show. In all respects, ‘law in context’ seems preferable to the most
likely alternatives ‘back to dogmatics’ and ‘forward to policies’. I have
tried to present ‘law in context’ as middle ground between both alterna-
tives, combining their virtues while avoiding their vices. Perhaps both
alternatives can be considered as reminiscents of a surpassed positivis-
tic ideology, but the argumentation of that hypothesis would need more
attention.
The question, then, is how legal dogmatics – itself the product of con-
tingent developments – can be enriched by the ‘law in context’
approach. In the most general terms, the recipe is twofold. First, we
must keep an open eye for the contextuality of law and legal pheno-
mena and be ready to give the contextual dimension of law its due. In
legal practice this is stimulated by the prominence of the facts and the
training of legal practitioners in their dealing with them. Their exper-
tise contains a good deal of practical wisdom and a strong hold on
moral attitudes, which is constantly triggered and strengthened. No
practitioner in her right mind would deny – in principle or in practice –
the contextuality of law, unless she is distorted by some legal theory like
Langdell’s legal formalism, Von Savigny’s Begriffsjurisprudenz, or Kel-
sen’s Reine Rechtslehre. In legal dogmatics, however, it is much harder
to keep an open eye for the contextuality of law. Legal scholars deal dif-
ferently with law and are more subject to methodological schools and
convictions. Here my second device applies. Legal scholars should do
better in interdisciplinary research, not as an escape to the application
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of the results or methods of other disciplines in the domain of law, but
as a way of changing perspective to grasp otherwise unnoticed aspects
of the practice under research. This is not the ‘law and…’ approach that
is viewed critically by so many, but a ‘law as…’ approach that James
Boyd White has addressed.
Interdisciplinary research entails both a broadening of the horizon as
well as an intellectual integration of the results. From this perspective
we have re-addressed the ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court in the
case of baby Kelly. The integration of a moral argumentation – though
most promising at first sight – turned out to be less than a success at
closer analysis. The Court ended up surrendering to a policy of victim
protection (a perfect exemplification of the ‘forward to policies’
approach). The reason is that it unconditionally placed the decision in
the service of the humanity of the life to be lived by Kelly. There are
other techniques for the integration of moral and pragmatic argu-
ments, however, that can avoid this pitfall. The Court could, for
example, have restricted its ruling to this specific case, or it could have
used specific legal concepts as intermediary for moral considerations.
These techniques of integration deserve more attention than received
in this book. The same goes for the techniques of interdisciplinary
research in legal dogmatics, as a way of enriching the study of law.
There is gold in those hills, but we have not yet sufficiently explored it.38
38. This seems to be the attitude of prominent legal scholars in the Netherlands as well, such
as J.B.M. Vranken, Algemeen Deel, vervolg, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, and H. Nieuwenhuis,
Waartoe is het recht op aarde?, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, p. 1-32.
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